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developed countries, while the crucial role of income and other sociodemographic variables 
seems to be confirmed. We also study the impact of cellular penetration, identifying a 
(positive) network effect in low penetration areas and some evidence of substitution 
(displacement) in the most developed ones. We finally analyze the supply side of the market, 
trying to assess the impact of market competition on investment: competition seemingly helps 
stimulating investment in the most developed areas, but has probably no significant impact in 
the less developed ones. 
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In most countries, including many developing countries, universal access to telecommunications is considered
as an important goal of public policy: universal access and universal service instruments are used to promote
access at affordable and non discriminatory prices, independently of local cost conditions. These policies are
justiﬁed on different grounds.1 The most important is the existence of network externalities: the larger the net-
work, the bigger the value of the service for each subscriber. It is not clear, though, that this kind of externality
could not be internalized by the operators without public intervention (for instance, Crandall and Waverman, 2000
clearly dispute this view). Another argument in favor of universal service policies is based on the identiﬁcation
of telecommunications services as merit goods. Access to telecommunications can reduce exclusion and increase
the opportunities of people (reducing the so called “digital divide”). For this reason, access to telecommunication
infrastructure should be granted to all citizens. A third argument sees telecommunications as an instrument for
regional development, especially for rural and remote areas. This last point is potentially very important in devel-
oping countries and it completes the standard externality argument. Telecommunications may have an impact on
ﬁrm productivity, education and thus economic growth.2
In practice, universal service policies or obligations are usually based on some form of cross-subsidization. His-
torically, telecommunications have been mostly provided by monopolies under regulated price structures. Cross
subsidies were implemented in order to provide the service at a subsidized rate to high cost consumers. In lib-
eralized markets, the use of subsidization becomes more complicated. First, competition itself reduces the scope
for cross subsidization (because of “cream skimming” in the more proﬁtable segments of the markets). Second,
cross subsidies have undesirable efﬁciency properties (distorting consumption and investment behaviors) which
conﬂict with the development of well functioning competitive markets. Nonetheless, from a theoretical point of
view, cross subsidies may still be a powerful tool for ﬁnancing universal service under competition in developing
countries (Gasmi et al., 1999, 2000).
The main critic to universal service policies is that they usually tax the most elastic segments of the market (long
distance, mobiles) to provide subsidized access (which is thought to be very inelastic). This introduces important
distortions in the economy, which have to be compared with the beneﬁts associated to the policies. Indeed, the de-
sirability of universal service policies depends both on demand and supply characteristics. In particular, if access
demand is very inelastic, subsidized access has a very low impact, which has to be compared to the possibly high
distortions introduced (see Hausman et al., 1993 and Hausman, 1998). Moreover, the supply side is also important.
Private competition can also contribute to lower prices and increase access, reducing the need for direct public
intervention. For instance, Clarke and Wallsten (2002) argue that liberalization has been much more beneﬁcial
than cross-subsidization policies in developing countries, also toward the poor. Then, the desirability of universal
1For a review of the theory of Universal Service provision, see Cremer et al. (1998).
2Roller and Waverman (2001) estimate the impact on GDP of telecommunications investment, adopting a simultaneous equation model on
a panel of OECD countries. They ﬁnd a positive effect of telecommunications on growth. They also identify a critical mass effect: the positive
impact on growth is larger when the diffusion of telecommunication is close to universal service (as in developed countries). Following Roller
and Waverman (2001), Sridhar and Sridhar (2004) estimate a similar model on data from non-OECD countries: they also ﬁnd a positive effect
on growth. Moreover, Waverman et al. (2005) show that, when considering mobile telephones, the growth dividend is even larger in developing
countries. In a recent paper, Jensen (2007) provides extensive evidence that the diffusion of mobile telecommunication services among Kerala
ﬁshermen has improved both market performance and total welfare.
2access policies is ultimately an open empirical question. It depends on demand characteristics (elasticities) as well
as supply characteristics (effect of competition and other market conditions).
Unfortunately, most of the existing empirical evidence concerns developed countries, due to the larger availability
of data. In these countries, the penetration of telecommunication infrastructure is close to saturation. There are
reasons to think that the relevant elasticities (e.g. price elasticity) could be different in less developed countries.
Similarly, the importance of network externalities and the related market failure could be larger at the ﬁrst stages
of diffusion. Finally, the role of the mobile technologies could be different in developing countries, which started
developing their telecommunications sector recently and are confronted with different technological options. The
existing empirical evidence on developing countries is limited: the present paper aims to add a contribution in this
sense. India is an appealing candidate for this kind of analysis. It is a low income country which experienced
an impressive development of telecommunications. Moreover, India is a federation of States with fairly differ-
ent socioeconomic conditions. This allows us to apply panel data techniques on homogeneously collected data.
Unfortunately, the existing data do not allow to perform sophisticated empirical analysis. Nonetheless we can
estimate simple models in a small cross-section-time-series data set and show some preliminary results which add
to the debate on universal service and universal access.
The paper proceeds as follows. After brieﬂy presenting the related empirical literature and the main features
of the Indian market for telecommunications, we analyze the characteristics of demand for ﬁxed lines (Sections
2 and 3). Our econometric analysis suggests that price elasticity in developing countries might be sensibly larger
than the usual estimates, sustaining the idea that subsidized access might be much more effective in developing
countries than in developed one. Moreover, the diffusion of mobile telephony seems to have different effects in
different regions. In the less developed ones, the diffusion of mobiles has a positive impact on the diffusion of
ﬁxed lines, while in the more developed ones there is some evidence of substitution (i.e. mobile telephones start
acting as a displacement technology). These results are conﬁrmed using an alternative speciﬁcation based on the
logistic diffusion model (Section 4). In the last part of the paper (Section 5), we estimate a simpliﬁed supply
equation trying to capture the effect of competition on infrastructure investment. This last exercise gives us some
preliminary insights on the supply side of the market and the potential for market driven development of the sector.
1.1 The Related Empirical Literature
Most of the existing studies estimating telecommunication access demand and the potential distortions associated
with universal service instruments are centered on the United States (for a discussion see Riordan, 2002). Due to
the federal structure of the country and the huge availability of data, accurate estimations of telecommunication
demand has been performed by several authors. In particular, the results by Kaserman et al. (1990), Hausman et al.
(1993) and Hausman (1998) opened a debate on the effectiveness of universal service policies and the distortions
introduced by industry taxes in the US telecommunication sector. They show that access demand has a very low
elasticity and thus the subsidies aimed to increase penetration have almost no impact. Even worse, they are likely
3to be socially inefﬁcient because they tend to tax the more elastic segments of the market (long distance, mobile
telecommunications) in order to cross subsidize access (see also Eriksson et al., 1998 and Garbacz and Thompson,
1997). Garbacz and Thompson (2002, 2003) performed a demand estimation based on decennial Census data, with
similar conclusions. In a more recent work, Ackerberg et al. (2008) concentrate directly on low-income demand
for telecommunication services, carefully taking into account for the possibility of endogenous determination of
the policies. They ﬁnd a higher elasticity of access demand than previous studies and argue that the impact of
universal service policies may have been underestimated. Following this contribution, Garbacz and Thompson
(2009) have re-estimated their previous model adjusting for endogeneity. They ﬁnd an increase in the impact
of targeted subsidization programs. However, they can still conclude that programs designed with the intent to
increase telephone penetration are increasingly less effective and more expensive.
Garbacz and Thompson (2005) have extended the approach developed in their previous studies to a panel of devel-
oped and developing countries. In both cases, they ﬁnd a non signiﬁcant price elasticity of access for ﬁxed lines,
questioning the effectiveness of USO policies focused on subsidized access. Similarly, Garbacz and Thompson
(2007) concentrates on less developed countries, ﬁnding a signiﬁcant but still very small elasticity of the connec-
tion charge and no signiﬁcant elasticity of the monthly charge. Then, the few existing studies seem to agree on the
fact that access price elasticity remains very low also in developing country. Contrarily to these ﬁndings, we ﬁnd
some preliminary evidence that price elasticity might be higher than the one obtained in the previous studies.
Some of the cited papers also investigate the relationship between ﬁxed and mobile technology. For instance,
Garbacz and Thompson (2007) suggest a current complementarity of mobile and ﬁxed services in developing
countries. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Garbacz and Thompson (2003) for the United States and Ahn and
Lee (1999) for a panel of 64 Countries. A bunch of other studies have analyzed the substitutability between ﬁxed
and mobile phones applying the logistic diffusion approach. Gruber and Verboven (2001) study the development
of mobile services in the European Union. The estimated impact of the ﬁxed network on the diffusion of mobiles
is negative. On the contrary, in the estimation made by Gruber (2001) to a panel of Central and Eastern European
countries a positive effect is found. More recently, Madden and Coble-Neal (2004) and Rouvinen (2006) estimate
two Gompertz diffusion models on panels of heterogeneous countries. Madden and Coble-Neal (2004) separate
the network effect from the pure substitution in usage. They show that the development of ﬁxed lines has a positive
effect on the diffusion of cellular phones (positive network effect), but the cross-price elasticity is positive (the
two modes of communications are substitutes in usage). Rouvinen (2006) ﬁnd evidence of network effects and
complementarity.
These heterogeneous results suggest the relation of complementarity or substitutability between ﬁxed and mobiles
phones is not necessarily the same in all countries. In some developing countries, the supply side constraints
associated with the inefﬁciency of the incumbent ﬁxed lines operator may induce households to choose a mobile
connection. For instance, anecdotical evidence shows that in many African countries mobile phones are a substi-
tute for ﬁxed lines, even in poor and rural villages. This is also supported by econometric evidence presented in
Waverman et al. (2005) for a panel of African and non African middle-income countries (see Waverman et al.,
2005). We consider this issue for the case of India investigating the effect of mobile phones in different areas
4at different levels of telecommunications and overall development. This allows us to give some insights on the
relationship between ﬁxed and mobile telephones diffusion at different stages of development.
1.2 Telecommunications in India
Telecommunications reforms in India started in 1991, when the Government announced the beginning of private
participation to the industry. The actual entry of private operators began some years later, around 1995/96. In
order to issue the licences, the Indian market was divided into 23 separated areas (Telecommunications Circles),
which roughly correspond to States, groups of small States or big metropolitan areas (Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and
Chennai). The metropolitan areas are treated separately and classiﬁed as Metros. The other areas divided three
categories on the basis of the perceived revenue potential (Circles of type A, B or C respectively). Initially, the
market was organized following a duopoly policy in which the incumbent was largely dominant. In this period
the telecommunications sector began to grow, after a long stagnation. The ﬁrst years of private participation were
quite turbulent, with litigations arising from the difﬁculties encountered by the private entrants in honoring the
payment of licences. In 1999 the New Telecommunication Policy (NTP) was announced: it shifted the licence
regime into a revenue share agreement and gave new authority to the regulator (TRAI), which was also put in
charge of price regulation. The following year the public incumbent BNSL was corporatized and the duopoly pol-
icy abandoned in favor of more competition. In addition, a rationalization of the interconnection policy boosted
the development of cellular telephony. The scope for Universal Service was enlarged and the increase in rural
teledensity began a priority. This is the period in which Indian telecommunications started experimenting ex-
traordinary rates of growth. Between 2002 and 2005 the total number of telephones increases from 30 to 104
millions. Interestingly, most of the growth was due to and increase in mobile connections, which passed from 6.4
to 57.4 millions (Noll and Wallsten, 2005). It is difﬁcult though to quantify to which extent this growth of mobile
connections reaches uncovered households (Malik and De Silva, 2005). It is then crucial to try and understand if
mobiles are a displacement technology with respect to ﬁxed lines, especially in these areas that are lagging behind
and constitute the natural target of universal service policies. When looking at total teledensity (ﬁxed and mobile
connections), we observe that the gap between urban and rural teledensity has steadily increased: the beneﬁts of
telecommunications growth seem to be mainly captured by wealthier and urban customers (see Figure 1).
The Indian government and regulator are increasingly concerned with the difﬁculties of promoting the univer-
sal service goals announced in the National Telecommunication Policy. The current policy instruments are two
different taxes: the Universal Service levy and the Access Deﬁcit Charge (ADC). The ﬁrst is paid as a percentage
of the revenue earned by the various operators. The second is mainly paid by private operators to the incumbent
for providing access in rural areas at a subsidized rate. The existing policies, and especially the ADC, have been
widely criticized for their inefﬁciency properties by many observers (see for instance Noll and Wallsten, 2005).
Moreover, the association of Indian telecom providers (AUSPI) and other observers haveexpressed concerns about
the high level of taxes on the Indian telecommunication industry, which could be an obstacle to further growth
of the sector. However, prices in India remain relatively low, if compared to the one prevailing in other countries
5Figure 1: Total Teledensity (source: TRAI)
with similar socioeconomic characteristics. The extent to which the current level of prices and the subsidized
access policy can inﬂuence diffusion depends on demand characteristics that have to be estimated (price elasticity,
diffusion of mobile phones). Our analysis aims to shed some light on the determinants of demand and investment
behaviors, helping to evaluate the plausible impact of subsidized access policies, market reforms and the diffusion
of mobile telephony.
Previous work on ﬁxed telephony demand in India has been done by Das and Srinivasan (1999). They give
an estimation of price elasticities and their data also allowed to distinguish between local and long distance calls
price elasticities. Their estimation of the price elasticity of aggregate telephone usage is comparable to the ones
in the present paper, but somehow smaller. The present paper, based on more recent data, extends and completes
their analysis, taking into account the effect of more recent reforms and exploiting the information contained in
the new market organization (the Circles classiﬁcation). Moreover, our data allow to study the impact of the recent
diffusion of mobile telephones on the deployment of ﬁxed-lines.
More recently, econometric work on Indian telecommunications has been done by Narayana (ming, 2009). These
papers present evidence based on survey data collected in 2003 for the State of Karnataka. Narayana (2009) shows
that education, income and castes are important explanators of telecommunications demand.3 Using State-level
panel data on all Indian States, the analysis conﬁrms the importance of income, literature and castes. In addition, it
shows that price elasticity is a signiﬁcant and rather important explanator of ﬁxed-lines demand. This is consistent
with the ﬁndings of Narayana (Forthcoming), which ﬁnds that usage price is a highly signiﬁcant explanator of
3He also distinguishes between rural and urban demand, showing that education and castes are somehow less important in rural areas.
6telecommunications demand. The evidence conﬁrms that price elasticity is likely to be very signiﬁcative, and its
impact might be larger than previously thought. Narayana (Forthcoming) also explores the relationship between
ﬁxed and mobile technologies and ﬁnds a substitution effect. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings in the
present paper for the more developed telecommunication Circles, such as Karnataka. However, it will be shown
that, in the less developed areas, an inverse relationship can arise, due to positive network externalities between
ﬁxed and mobile telephones.
1.3 The data
We build a small cross-section-time-series dataset using several Indian institutional sources. To assess demand
and supply characteristics, we need data on telecommunications diffusion and prices as well as socioeconomic
and market indicators. As often with less developed countries, some of these data are difﬁcult to ﬁnd. For all
telecommunications variables, we use data from the Department of Telecommunications (DOT) of India An-
nual Reports from 1994 to 2004 and from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). They also contain
some demographic variables such as population and population density (population per square kilometer). Other
sociodemographic variables are constructed using the information contained in the decennial Census surveys.4
Data on competition are collected by the Indian Regulator TRAI. Finally, some data on investment (capital out-
lays) are published (only) by the incumbent operators (BNSL and MTNL): the series from 1998 is available at
http://www.indiastat.com. As an alternative measure of the level of investment, we use the equipped capacity of
the exchanges, which is also available for the private undertakings.
These data as several problems. The ﬁrst is that our dataset is very small and does only allow to estimate simple
models. Moreover, some of the available data are admittedly only proxies of the economic variables we would
ideally use in our econometric analysis. In this respect, the main problem is that the only available measure of the
price level is the average revenue per line. This is clearly not very satisfactory, but we could not ﬁnd an alternative
(Waverman et al. (2005) have the same problem). Moreover, no price index is available for mobile telephony,
limiting our analysis on the relationship between the two technologies.
On the bright side, the existing data are all collected homogeneously by the national statistical ofﬁces and insti-
tutions, reducing the omitted variable bias which is sometimes important in cross-countries analysis. Moreover,
even this small dataset fortunately allow us to give some insights on phenomena we try to explain. More details
about the data and their limitations are given when the variables and the estimation methods are introduced.
2 The demand for mainlines
We start our analysis on the demand for telecommunications in India estimating a linear demand equation. At
this stage, we use the number of main lines per 100 population as a proxy for service penetration. This is of
4Because of their slow dynamics, the annual values have been reconstructed interpolating the available decennial trends. We considered
the possibility of adding data from the National Sample Surveys. They are collected in different years but they are not directly comparable to
Census data, especially in reason of smaller samples. For this reason, they have not been included in the series.
7Table 1: Variable Description and Sources
Name Description Source
del direct exchange lines per 100 people DOT
wl waiting lists per 100 people DOT
pen direct exchange lines + waiting list DOT
per 100 people
hpen household penetration (% of households DHS+
with a ﬁxed line in 1999)
p average revenue per direct exchange lines DOT
in real prices
month monthly subscription in real prices ITU
cellpen cellular penetration (cellular phones DOT
per 100 people)
area State area in square kilometer Census
ruraldel share of rural direct exchange lines
density population per square kilometer DOT
y per capita real gross domestic product Indiastat
in real prices
liter literacy rate Census
castes rate of population in scheduled castes Census
or tribes
capacity total capacity of local public switching DOT
exchanges
comp number of competitors TRAI
compcell number of mobile phone providers TRAI
inv capital outlays (BNSL) in real prices Indiastat
course not completely satisfactory because this does not correspond to household penetration or even residential
lines. However, since main lines are reported on yearly basis in most countries, this allows us to have a ﬁst as-
sessment of the determinants of demand and to compare it with the existing studies. As standard, we assume that
demand for telephone mainlines is a function of price, income and other variables controlling for living conditions.
log(penit) = ¯0 + ¯1 log(pit) + ¯2 log(yit) + ¯3Xit + "it
The left hand side variable pen is given by the sum of main lines and waiting list (per 100 people). The in-
clusion of waiting lists tries to capture some of the demand which is not satisﬁed due to supply side constraints
(unfortunately, some of the demand is probably completely discouraged in case of very poor supply, but we cannot
control for that). p is the indicator of the price level, y is per capita income and X is a vector of control variables
(sociodemographic characteristics and, possibly, ﬁxed effects and time dummies). All variables are taken in logs
(excluding dummies) and the coefﬁcient can be interpreted as elasticities. As mentioned in Section 1.3, as a proxy
for the level of the price p we use the average revenue per main line. This raises a clear problem of endogene-
ity: we try to reduce the bias introduced by this problem with a simple instrumental variable strategy which is
discussed below.5 Other explanatory variables are population density (density) and sociodemographic variables
such as the literacy rate (liter) and the percentage of inhabitants belonging to scheduled castes and tribes (castes).
5In Section 1, we mentioned that the diffusion of telecommunications services can have a positive impact on growth. This may raise an
endogeneity problem also for the regressor y. For this reason, we also run all regressions removing y and alternatively replacing it with the
share of population which has access to electricity (access to electricity is highly correlated with the level of life): this does not modify our
8Population density is used to capture the access externality that ﬂows form potential subscribers in a given area,
and can then be interpreted as the value of accessing a network of subscribers (access externality). Indeed, popu-
lation density has been used to measure the access externality in most of the existing studies, such as Crandall and
Waverman (2000) and in the works of Garbacz and Thompson (2002,2005,2007). The same strategy is adopted
here, which facilitates comparison of our results with the previous literature. On the other hand, Riordan (2002)
note that this strategy may have some limits because population size and density are positively correlated. It is then
possible that density is picking up two contrary effects, the local network externality effect, and a face-to-face
communication effect. For this reason, Riordan (2002) also controls for the population size. This possibility was
also tested, but the results were not signiﬁcantly affected.6
Literacy rates have been used in several study to capture the level of life which, especially in developing countries,
is often not well described by per capita GDP. Scheduled castes and tribes register people traditionally consid-
ered “outcastes” (also called “untouchables”), relegated to marginal occupations and victims of social exclusion.
These groups are now accorded a special status under the Constitution, trying to reduce their socioeconomic dis-
advantage. The percentage of people belonging to scheduled castes and tribes can be interpreted as a proxy for
poverty, describing the impact of belonging to less favored segments of the population. This is also a rough way
to distinguish minority ethnic groups, which may have different consumption behaviors.
In India, the basic tariffs (access, monthly rent) are regulated at the central level. This reduces the problem of price
endogeneity (these tariffs are not subject to idiosyncratic shocks at the State level). However, the average revenue
per line does not depend only on these tariffs, but also on the patterns of usage and the different tariff plans, which
we cannot observe. To try reduce the endogeneity bias, we estimate an instrumental variable regression in which
thepriceisendogenous. Theavailabledatamakeitdifﬁculttobuildinstrumentsfortheprice. Wecanjustusesome
cost proxy as well as market conditions for the identiﬁcation strategy. Unfortunately, our small database does not
allow to use more sophisticated procedures such as the Arellano-Bond/Blundell/Bover system GMM estimators,
which use the entire set of lagged values of the dependent and of the other endogenous covariates as instruments.
With our small database, the model collapses and no sensible estimate of the parameters can be obtained. We then
turned to a simple instrumental variable regression, in which the ﬁrst stage equation predicts the value of the price
from a regression on cost proxies, policy indicators and competition measures.7 In the second stage, the demand
estimation is performed. The ﬁrst instrument we use is the rural percentage of existing lines (ruralshare). This
can ﬁrst be interpreted as a cost proxy. Interestingly, price regulation at the national level imposes different tariffs
for the rural areas. This tariffs are decided at the central level and homogeneous across the country (they are the
same in all States): for this reason, the rural share is not only a cost proxy, but it embodied an an exogenous con-
straint on the revenue per line, independent of State-level idiosyncratic conditions. A second cost proxy is given
ﬁndings. When removing y, the coefﬁcient of the other indicators of the level of life (literacy rate, share of population in scheduled castes)
increase, but the main results of the analysis are preserved.
6In the same spirit, Garbacz and Thompson (2002) also test the impact of an externality variable deﬁned as “penetration times the number
of households”. The introduction of an externality variable of the same kind (deﬁned as pop ¤ (cell + pen)=100) has been checked and it
does not change the main ﬁndings.
7The use of a set of instruments of this nature is quite standard in this literature, although market reforms themselves might be endogenous.
In our case, this concern is not an issue, because the telecommunication policies are decided at the central level and introduced at the same
time in all Circles. However, this annuls the cross section variability. The effective development of competition (number of entrants) has cross
section variability. However, because the issuing of licences was made only in some years (the same for all States) time variation is small.
9by the investment cost per line (inv=del). As for the market structure and market reforms variables, we include a
dummy for the NTP (i.e. equal to 1 for the years following 1999), the number of competitors in basic services8
and interactions between the number of competitors and the NTP. The reasoning for introducing interactions is
that, as explained in Section 1.2, before the application of the National Competition Policy, the extent of effec-
tive liberalization was very limited and the competitor largely dominant. We would expect competition to reduce
prices. However, competition can be associated with increasing quality/variety and consequently with increasing
prices. Moreover, entry may be driven by unobservable proﬁtability characteristics which are also correlated to
the demand for new lines. For this reason, we also control for the circle types, introducing circle-classiﬁcation
dummies, controlling for unobservable proﬁtability characteristics.9 Moreover, we interact the number of com-
petitors with the Circles dummies, allowing for different impacts in areas with different market conditions. The
ﬁrst stage regression conﬁrms our intuitions.10 Competition (entry) alone has no signiﬁcative effect on prices. A
signiﬁcative and negative effect of entry on prices is founded interacting comp with the circle types, but only for
low penetration Circles. In the most proﬁtable Circles entry is not associated with a signiﬁcative price reduction,
probably because of unobservable increases in the quality or variety of the services. ruralshare has a negative
impact on the price, which would mean that it is not measuring costs, but rather exogenous negative impact on the
rentability of lines. On the contrary, inv seems to be capturing cost proxies, increasing the price measure. The
results of the ﬁrst stage regression are given in Table 2.




















¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1% level, ¤¤ signiﬁcant
at 5% level, ¤ signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Table 3 illustrate the estimation results of the different models. The basic OLS regression is given in Column
(1). The price elasticity is estimated at ¡0:397 and income and sociodemographic variables appears important in
explaining demand for main lines.
8Because mobile providers may also exert a competitive constraint on mainline operators, we also estimate an alternative speciﬁcations
using the number of mobile competitors, with very similar results
9Because all socioeconomic variables are collected at the State level, we use dummy variables for the Circle types (A, B or C respectively)
and include the Metros in the Circles of the respective States (Delhi, which constitutes at the same time a separate State and a metro Circle, is
put in the same group as the A-Circles).
10Although Table 2 only shows the impact of the excluded instruments on the endogenous variables, all exogenous variables have been
included in the ﬁrst stage regression before estimating the demand equation. Standard statistics have been run to evaluate the identiﬁcation
strategy. The Sargan test for overidentiﬁcation does not reject exogeneity, while the partial R-squared of the exclude instrument is 0:39.
10In order to exploit the panel nature of the data, we introduce ﬁxed state effects in order to account for cross section
time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The problem is that the sociodemographic variables display a very little
time variation, making it difﬁcult to estimate their impact in a ﬁxed effect speciﬁcation. Column (2) of the table 3
reports the results of the ﬁxed effect regression. The price elasticity of ¡0:603. Sociodemographic characteristics
are highly non signiﬁcant and have implausible signs. We then estimate the same model with random effects:
the results are presented in Column (3). This gives a price elasticity of ¡0:723 and reasonable coefﬁcients for
the sociodemographic characteristics.11 In column (4) we introduce ﬁxed effect for the circle types (A, B or C
type). This strategy allows to control for differences among heterogeneous groups of States, which share some
unobservable proﬁtability and market characteristics. Introducing ﬁxed effects for the Circles allows to introduce
meaningful ﬁxed effect and at the same time to estimate the impact of the variables characterized by small time
variation. Controlling for these ﬁxed effects, the price elasticity is ¡0:640 and the magnitude of the other explana-
tory variables remains comparable. In Column (5) we present the instrumental variable regression: the coefﬁcient
for the price is -0.721, sensibly higher (in absolute value) than the OLS. In this estimation, the number of obser-
vations is smaller because less observations are available for the chosen instruments.
All our speciﬁcations suggest that the price elasticity might be higher than previously thought. Exploiting the
panel dimension (ﬁxed and time effects) shows that the OLS regression is biased toward zero. The instrumental
variable regression give a more precise assessment of this bias. Contrarily to the ﬁndings of Garbacz and Thomp-
son (2005, 2007), our evidence about India, although based on a poorer dataset, seems on the contrary to suggest
that access elasticity in less developed countries is somehow higher. Taking into account the fact that tariffs in
India are sensibly lower than in other developing countries in the same income group, one could even expect the
price elasticity to play a larger role in other developing economies. As in all the existing studies, the importance of
income effects is conﬁrmed. All the variables describing the level of life seem to play an crucial role in explaining
the demand for telecommunications. The impact of literacy is positive and large. Belonging to scheduled castes
or tribes is shown to negatively affect demand for telecommunications access.
We now turn to the question of the impact of mobile telephony diffusion on the development of the ﬁxed
network. This is particularly relevant in India, where the growth of mobile telephony in the last years has been
impressive. Still, mobile phones are mainly available in metropolitan areas.
Two opposite effects can play. On the one hand, mobile and ﬁxed telephones can be seen as substitutes. On the
other, the diffusion of mobile phones can have a positive network externality on ﬁxed lines (this would mean that,
although ﬁxed and mobiles might not be complements in for a given consumer, the development of the wireless
technology has a positive impact on the diffusion of mainlines). Lacking information about mobile prices at the
State level, we cannot really asses the existence of economics substitutability between the two services. However,
we can derive some preliminary results on the impact of mobile phones on the diffusion of ﬁxed lines and in par-
ticular on the question if mobile telephony represents a displacement technology. In order to do that, we introduce
11We perform a panel robust version of the Hausman test for ﬁxed versus random effects.12 The test does not reject the hypothesis of random
effects (at the 5% level). Even if the coefﬁcient estimates are sensibly different in the two estimations, due to the high standard errors the test




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12the level of cellular penetration (cellpen) as an explanatory variable in the equation describing the demand for
ﬁxed lines. Obviously, this rises new endogeneity concerns. Both measures of service penetration (ﬁxed and mo-
bile) might be correlated with unobservable determinants of telecommunications diffusion. However, we can try to
identify the effect of mobile telephones from the gap between different areas, characterized by different telecom-
munications market characteristics (a similar strategy has been used, in a totally different context, by George and
Waldfogel, 2006). In the identiﬁcation strategy we use again the information captured by the circle classiﬁcation.
This strategy is correct as long as we believe that the unobservable change in ﬁxed lines correlated with cellpen
goes in the same direction in low and high penetration Circles. The results of the regression including mobile
phones as an explanatory variables are given in Columns (6) and (7).13 The coefﬁcient of cellular penetration
is positive, though rather small. This would indicate that a positive network effect exists at the aggregate level.
Unfortunately, the result could be also driven by the endogeneity of cellpen. In order to better identify this effect,
as mentioned above, we interact the variable cellpen with the dummies for circle types. This is the continuous
equivalent of separate estimations of the effect of mobiles for the different groups of Circles, characterized by
different stages of market development. We identify the impact of mobiles diffusion from the gap between the
propensity to subscribe ﬁxed lines in the different circle types. The positive effect is conﬁrmed in Circles of type
B and C, which are the one with lower penetration. Network externalities and complementarities between the ser-
vices seem to be more important where coverage is poor. On the contrary, for A-Circles the coefﬁcient is negative
(but non signiﬁcant), showing a tendency toward the displacement of ﬁxed lines by mobile diffusion. Unfortu-
nately, from the existing data, it is not possible to study cross-price elasticities in order to address the question
of potential substitutability in usage, which plausibly introduce a form of competition between ﬁxed and mobile
providers. However, the results of our analysis sheds new light on the impact of cellular telephony at different
level of general telecommunication service diffusion.
3 Access demand: a logit speciﬁcation
In Section 2, we provided a ﬁrst estimation of demand for main lines. To go from lines to access demand it
is necessary to build a variable describing household penetration. Available data include both the number of
direct exchange lines and the number of households. The problem is that direct exchange lines does not exactly
correspond to subscribers at the household level (and they include business connections). We then use information
on household penetration available for the year 1999 in the DH+ Surveys to reconstruct the relationship between
direct exchange lines and subscribers (we are forced to assume that this relationship is stable across time, possibly
introducing some problem of measurement error). Using this measure of household penetration, we want now to
estimate a logit model in which the binary variable is the decision to connect to the network. Formally, the logistic
regression model speciﬁes the probability of being connected ¼ as:
13In the regression, cellpen appears to be highly collinear with the time dummies starting from year 2000. As explained in Section 1.2,
after the New Telecommunication Policy, a change in the access policies favored the diffusion of mobiles. This can explain the existence of
two different “time periods”. We then replace year dummies with the NTP dummy. Using a time trend gives very close results.



























time dummies yes yes
observations 200 200
¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1% level, ¤¤ signiﬁcant at 5% level,
¤ signiﬁcant at 10% level.
¼it =
exp¯Zit
1 + exp¯Zit (1)
Where Z represents the explanatory variables. We use hpen as the measure of household penetration. Explanatory
variables include price, income and the other the other controls used in Section 2. In our data, observations are
indeed State-level proportions and not household level observations. Logit models with proportions (grouped
data) need a treatment of the heteroskedasticity related to within-cell heterogeneity (a cell is here a grouped
observation of a proportion at the State level, and not a household level binary variable). Different strategies
may be implemented. We apply here two standard estimation techniques: the minimum chi-square and maximum
likelihood estimators. The minimum chi-square estimation (MCSE) is given in Column (1) of Table 4.14
The maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is presented in Column (2). Although MCSE and MLE have the same
asymptotic properties, they are not equivalent in small samples.15
As shown in table (4) the estimated coefﬁcient and standard errors are very closed to the one obtained by
MCSE.
In both estimations, the coefﬁcients are interpreted as quasi-elasticities. In the logit model, the derivative of
the probability of having telephone service with respect to an explanatory variable xi is given by:
@ ¼it
@xi
= ¯i ¼it (1 ¡ ¼it)
From this expression one can derive the relevant elasticities. Computing the price elasticity at the sample
14The estimation is carried using a two-step procedure. We ﬁrst estimate an OLS model explaining hpen as a function of the explanatory




nit^ ¼it(1 ¡ ^ ¼it)
Where nit is the number of households grouped in the aggregate observation for State i at time t.




ni logfhpeni log(¼i) + (1 ¡ hpeni)log(1 ¡ ¼i)g
14mean, we ﬁnd a coefﬁcient of ¡0:61. Elasticity is smaller in States with higher penetration and/or in more recent
years. The minimum value is as small as ¡0:17. Consistent with the ﬁnding of Section 2, the average values
are sensibly higher than the ones estimate for developing countries, but seems to be decreasing when penetration
improves. Teledensity is signiﬁcantly affected by income and other sociodemographic characteristics: income
growth and increases in education may boost telecommunications growth. Elasticities with respect to representa-
tive variables are given in Table 5.
Table 5: Elasticities
variable average min max ’01-’04
p -0.61 -1.65 -0.17 -0.40
y 0.75 0.19 1.12 0.75
liter 1.86 1.28 2.55 1.88
castes -0.35 -1.04 -0.10 -0.33
Elasticities are computed from the maximum likelihood
estimations presented in Table 4, Column (3).
Introducing mobile phones penetration, we ﬁnd again a positive effect in lower penetration Circles (higher
in C-Circles). On the contrary, in A-Circles, the impact of mobile on ﬁxed penetration is signiﬁcantly negative,
suggesting that substitution between ﬁxed and mobiles platforms may be going on in the more developed areas.
4 Diffusion of telecommunications: a logistic diffusion approach
The issues related with telecommunication diffusion and network effects present some dynamic aspects which are
not captured by the models estimated above. In particular, the individual decision to connect may depend on the
size already reached by the network itself as well as on the development of complementary network goods (the
diffusion of mobile phones, for instance). Several recent papers study mobile telecommunications diffusion and
try to assess the impact of ﬁxed lines on the development of the mobile network (see Section 1.1). Contrarily
to these contributions, we look here at the diffusion process governing the ﬁxed lines. We thus characterize
the determinants of ﬁxed lines diffusion and the impact of mobile penetration on the development of the ﬁxed
network. We assume that telephone penetration tends towards an equilibrium level pen¤, following a logistic
process. In theory, both the equilibrium penetration and the shape of the logistic curve might depend on prices,
income, socioeconomic characteristics and market conditions. However, such a general speciﬁcation complicates
too much the estimation of the model, especially with a small dataset (see also Gruber and Verboven, 2001 on this
point). We thus compare two alternative speciﬁcations of the logistic process. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the rate
of convergence is kept constant, while the equilibrium penetration is assumed to depend on our set of explanatory
variables. In the second speciﬁcation, we specify the market potential as a ﬁxed share of the total population
(to be estimated), while the initial state and the rate of convergence are a function of the demand and supply
15Table 6: Household Access Model with Mobiles
variable: log( ¼
1¡¼) (1) (2) (3) (4)
p ¡0:0001¤¤¤ ¡0:0001¤¤¤ ¡0:0001¤¤¤ ¡0:0001¤¤¤
(0:00002) (0:0002) (0:00002) (0:00002)
y 0:00009¤¤¤ 0:00008¤¤¤ 0:00009¤¤¤ 0:00009¤¤¤
(0:00001) (0:00001) (0:00001) (0:00001)
density 0:00008¤¤¤ 0:00008 0:00008¤¤¤ 0:00009¤¤¤
(0:00002) (0:00002) (0:00002) (0:00002)
liter 0:303¤¤¤ 0:327¤¤¤ 0:027¤¤¤ 0:029¤¤¤
(0:004) (0:003) (0:004) (0:0025)
castes ¡0:018¤¤¤ ¡0:015¤¤¤ ¡0:018¤¤¤ ¡0:016¤¤¤
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:003)
cellpen ¡0:017 ¡0:052 - -
(0:035) (0:037)
cellpen*circle-A - - ¡0:074¤¤ ¡0:080¤¤
(0:032) (0:027)
cellpen*circle-B - - 0:353¤¤¤ 0:335¤¤¤
(0:077) (0:083)
cellpen*circle-C - - 0:313 0:473
(0:479) (0:353)
Min Chi-Sq yes no yes no
MLE no yes no yes
observations 209 209 209 209
¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1% level, ¤¤ signiﬁcant at 5% level, ¤ signiﬁcant at 10% level.
characteristics.
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the ﬁrst difference equation is a linearized Gompertz model, given by:
log(penit) ¡ log(penit¡1) = ®[log(pen¤
it) ¡ log(penit¡1)]
The equilibrium penetration log(pen¤) as a linear function of demand determinants:
log(pen¤
it) = ¯ log(Xit)
Xit includes price, income, mobile phone penetration and other sociodemographic variables. The results of
the estimation are given in Table 7. Price, income and sociodemographic characteristics have the expected signs.
Decomposing the effect of cellular penetration in the different Circle types, we ﬁnd conﬁrmation of the main
conclusions of the static models. The network effect appears more pronounced in low penetration Circles and
some evidence of substitution is found for Circles of type A.




1 + exp(¡ait ¡ bit t)
(2)
This model is more ﬂexible and allows for nonconstant diffusion parameters. Diffusion follows a logistic
process. ait represents the location parameter: it shifts the diffusion function without affecting the S-shape. bit





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17Table 8: Diffusion Equation 2: Logistic Regression
variable: penit (1) (2) (3)
pen¤ 0:162¤¤¤ 0:184¤¤¤ 0:182¤¤¤
(0:015) (0:025) (0:025)
p ¡0:0000005 ¡0:000004 ¡0:0000009
(¡0:000006) (¡0:000007) (¡0:000006)
y 0:00002¤¤¤ 0:00002¤¤¤ 0:00002¤¤¤
(0:000003) (0:000003) (0:000003)
liter 0:0092¤¤¤ 0:0086¤¤¤ 0:0087¤¤¤
(0:001) (0:001) (0:0010)
castes 0:0015 0:001 0:001¤
(0:0007) (0:007) (0:0006)
cellpen ¡0:010 - 0:010
(0:009) (0:007)
cellpen*circle-A - ¡0:018¤¤¤ ¡0:028¤¤¤
(0:005) (0:006)
cellpen*circle-B - 0:009 -
(0:09)
cellpen*circle-C - 0:073¤¤ -
(0:036)
observations 190 190 190
¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1% level, ¤¤ signiﬁcant at 5% level, ¤ signiﬁcant at 10% level.
phones in the parameter b. In the location parameter a, we include ﬁxed Circle effects (i.e. ait = ai), allowing
location to depend on the circle types16. The model is estimated with nonlinear least squares, after adding an error
term to Equation 2. The results are given in Table 8. All variables have the expected sign. As for the diffusion
of mobile telephones, we still ﬁnd a positive, though non signiﬁcant network effect. In Column (2) the effect
of mobile penetration is interacted with Circle dummies. The results conﬁrm the analysis above: in A-Circles
cellular penetration has a negative impact of mobiles on the speed of diffusion of ﬁxed lines. In the other Circle
types the estimated effect is positive.
The application of the two proposed diffusion models conﬁrms the ﬁndings of the previous speciﬁcations. For
low level of penetration, the network effect is more important and mobiles and ﬁxed lines have a complementary
development. In a more mature phase, consumers start substituting ﬁxed with mobile services. There is no
evidence that mobiles diffusion is displacing ﬁxed lines in low penetration Circles.
5 Supply of telecommunications: investment
As mentioned in Section 1, universal service policies and the development of competition can both contribute
to stimulate telecommunications diffusion. If the development of competition is able to induce an increase of
investment in the sector, we can hope that autonomous market driven development would lead to higher telecom-
munications diffusion, making direct public intervention less crucial. To assess the impact of liberalization on the
performance of the sector, we estimate a supply equation similar to the one proposed in Roller and Waverman
16Other speciﬁcation has been tested, for instance including the NTP dummy in both ait and bit. The inclusion of the NTP dummy allows
to see if the policy change created a ‘jump’ and/or an acceleration of the diffusion process. Both coefﬁcient were not signiﬁcant and the other
estimates were not particularly affected.
18(2001). The endogenous variable is the state level of investment. We estimate the following equation:
log(invit) = ¯0 + ¯1 log(areai) + ¯2 logwlit + ¯3 log(pit) + ¯4Xit
Where area is the geographic area of the State, wl is the waiting list (which aims to represent potential
demand) and X are other control variables. In particular, we use as a control variable the number of competitors of
the regulated ﬁrm in the basic services. In principle, notwithstanding the results discussed in the previous Sections,
mobiles phones can also exert a competitive pressure on the ﬁxed operators, altering proﬁt opportunities. We thus
also estimate the model including the number of mobile operators in the different Circles. This does not change
the qualitative results not alter signiﬁcatively the magnitude of the effects (results not shown). Data on investment
(State-wise capital outlays) are published by the incumbent ﬁrms and not by competitors. The estimation gives
nevertheless some interesting insights on the differences in the investment behavior in the different States/Circles
(see Table 9). Consistent with the ﬁndings of previous studies, we ﬁnd a positive impact of geographic area.
Moreover, the regression shows a positive and signiﬁcant impact of the waiting list wl: investment is demand
responsive. We also ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant impact of competition. The coefﬁcient of the price is very
small and non signiﬁcant, meaning that proﬁtability would not have an impact on the investment decision. Also
in this case, using the price as an explanatory variables probably introduces endogeneity problems. For these
reason, we replace the average price with other proﬁtability measures. As mentioned, Circle dummies capture
some characteristics related to the proﬁtability of the different Circle Types. We also add population density,
which could affect the average main lines proﬁtability. After adding these new controls, the competition variable
turns out not to be signiﬁcant. To disentangle the effect of competition from the proﬁtability characteristics of
the Circles, we build new variables interacting competition with the different circle categories. This identiﬁcation
strategy is of the same nature that the one used in assessing the impact of mobile telephone diffusion on the
demand for ﬁxed lines (Sections 2, 3, 4). We now estimate:




Where circlej, j 2 fA;B;Cg are dummies for the circle classiﬁcation. The results are given in Column 2. We
see that competition has a positive impact on investment in type A and B Circles (which are the ones with higher
expected proﬁtability) but it is non signiﬁcant in C-Circles (the low penetration ones).
We ﬁnally perform a similar regression using the equipped capacity as a measure of investment. Equipped
capacity measures the total capacity of the switching exchanges, i.e. the maximal number of lines that can be
connected. Data on capacity, published by the Department of Telecommunications, include the capacity provided
by the private undertakings. They take into account private entry and, contrarily to capital outlays, do not refer
only to the public incumbent. The results, presented in Table 10 are directly comparable to the ones in Table
9. All the signiﬁcant coefﬁcients, and in particular the one describing the impact of competition, have the same
sign and similar magnitude. We also replace the left hand side variable (capac) with the excess capacity (i.e. the
difference between the capacity installed by the ﬁrms and the active lines). The results are very similar in sign and
magnitude (output not shown) and in this case the effect of competition in C-Circles is even negative (and still not
signiﬁcant).
19Table 9: Investment Equation 1
variable: inv (1) (2) (3)
p 0:031 - -
(0:276)
wl 0:408¤¤¤ 0:210¤¤¤ 0:304¤¤¤
(0:071) (0:033) (0:037)
area 0:341¤¤¤ 0:546¤¤¤ 0:659¤¤¤
(0:078) (0:038) (0:043)
density - 0:617¤¤¤ 0:733¤¤¤
(0:042) (0:410)
comp 0:341¤¤¤ 0:040 -
(0:054) (0:037)
comp*circle-A - - 0:231¤¤¤
(0:040)
comp*circle-B - - 0:085¤¤¤
(0:055)
comp*circle-C - - 0:087
(0:120)
circle-level ﬁxed effects no yes no
observations 115 133 133
¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1% level, ¤¤ signiﬁcant at 5% level, ¤ signiﬁcant
at 10% level.
Table 10: Investment Equation 2















time dummies yes yes
circle-level ﬁxed effects yes no
observations 197 197
¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1% level, ¤¤ signiﬁcant at 5% level,
¤ signiﬁcant at 10% level.
20The results seem to suggest that the existence of competition stimulates investment in more proﬁtable areas,
but not in regions with less developed markets/less demand potential. These ﬁndings do not support the idea that
the protection of its monopoly position is at the origin of the low levels of investment of the incumbent. In low
proﬁtability ones entry does not seem to have a signiﬁcative impact on investment. The beneﬁts of competition
are thus concentrated in the Circles with the highest expected proﬁtability. The results goes more on the direction
of suggesting the fact that market driven investment tends to concentrate in proﬁtable areas, potentially increasing
the gap in penetration between proﬁtable and less proﬁtable segments of the market. Public intervention would
than be needed to stimulate investment in low penetration areas.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the Indian telecommunications market for mainlines, trying to derive some preliminary evi-
dence on the determinants of mainlines diffusion and the impact of the contemporaneous development of mobile
telephony. The results suggest that (access) price elasticity for main lines might be larger than the usual estimates
for developed countries, although decreasing with time and smaller in higher penetration zones. For this reason,
subsidized access might be more effective than previously thought. Moreover, literacy rate and other sociode-
mographic variables seem to have a large impact on demand: they are important engines of telecommunications
development. Considering the relationship between ﬁxed and mobile telecommunications, we ﬁnd that a positive
network externality is present in low penetration areas. On the contrary, where the telecommunications market is
more developed, we ﬁnd evidence of displacement of ﬁxed lines by mobile telephony. We interpret these results as
suggestive that the network effect between mobiles and ﬁxed phones is determinant at the ﬁrst stages of telecom-
munications diffusion. In more mature markets, a substitution effect arises. The existence of substitution in most
developed areas challenges the possibility of cross subsidization of less developed Circles with higher taxes/tariffs
in the most developed ones. Although competition does not seem being currently reducing the revenues in high
proﬁtability areas, substitution between ﬁxed and mobiles might undermine cross-subsidization policies. Where
ﬁxed and mobiles are substitutes, the development of a competitive mobile telephony market can also play a role
in stimulating efﬁciency and price reductions, thus reducing the need for direct universal service policies. The last
part of the paper provide some evidence that the introduction of competition in the ﬁxed as well as in the mobile
segments have boosted investment in the regions where the telecommunications market is more mature. However,
in very low penetration areas, entry seems not to have a signiﬁcant impact on investment. The concerns about the
increasing gap between more and less developed regions are thereby reinforced by our results. For stimulating
investment in less developed areas some direct intervention seems to be necessary: a true competition for the
market and an efﬁcient subsidization policy (public funds assigned through non discriminatory auctions) could be
a response to this problem.
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